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Many developing countries have attempted to pursue the East Asian
growth model in recent decades. This model is widely perceived to
have been based on export-led growth. Given that developed countries
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the post 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the pre-crisis decades. We nd in particular that, among our variables
of interest, the proportion of a countrys manufactured exports that is
destined for industrialized countries is the one most robustly associated
with output growth. The results have implications for continued post-
crisis growth in Asian developing countries.
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1 Introduction and Background
Growth is perhaps the foremost goal of policy makers across the world. In pur-
suing this objective, strategies have varied across countries, and within coun-
tries, across time. One such strategy, that of export-led growth, has been most
directly associated with East Asian countries in recent decades. While, as we
will see shortly, the term export-led growth could have more than one interpre-
tation, the common thread uniting these is the hypothesis that either exports
or net exports (i.e., trade surpluses) drive growth.
The original larger East Asian tigers, i.e., South Korea and Taiwan are
widely believed to have pursued import-substitution policies in the earlier phases
of their rapid growth experience (in the 1950s and 60s), followed by export
promotion beginning in the latter half of the 60s.1 Indeed, the pursuit of export
promotion rather than import substitution, is what, according to numerous
scholars, has distinguished the East Asian export performance from that of
other less successful developing countries.2 This model of export-led growth in
recent years appears to have become a desirable template for many developing
countries across the globe. In particular, relatively rapid growth along with
current account surpluses in developing countries, especially those in the Asian
region, following the Asian nancial crisis of 1997-98 and the global recession
in 2001 generated considerable interest in the potential of export-led growth.
Figure 1 illustrates the weighted current account as a percentage of GDP for the
19 developed countries in our sample below (see Section 3 and Table 2 for details
of the sample).3 Unprecedented growth in China along with its accumulation
of record amounts of foreign exchange reserves have only served to conrm the
perceived e¢ cacy of such a growth strategy.
Critics, however, have pointed out that the existence of a fallacy of compo-
sition or adding-up constraint undermines the sustainability and/or universal
applicability of such a strategy. For one country to export more, at least one
other country has to import more. A simultaneous pursuit of export-led growth
by all developing countries, especially if concentrated in a similar range of man-
ufactured products, could only be successful if demand from developed countries
grows at a correspondingly rapid pace, and/or if the terms of trade move against
the growing countries, thus increasing competitiveness in an imperfect substi-
tutes framework.4 Moreover, if the aim is to achieve growth in net exports,
1See, for example, Weiss [2005].
2See, for example, Bhagwati [1990].
3The current account to GDP (CA-GDP) ratio was obtained for the period 1999-2009
from the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) COMTRADE
database for 2010 and from the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD) SourceOECD database for 2010. The annual weights assigned to each developed
country for calculating the annual weighted CA-GDP ratio were based on the share of total
manufactured exports to developed countries from the 44 Asian countries in our sample that
went to that particular country that year. In other words, we weigh the industrialized
countries according to their importance as an export destination for Asian countries.
4Barring the unlikely case where developing country products are perfect substitutes for
developed country products, or where there is complete pass-through of exchange rate changes
into developing country export prices when measured in domestic currency terms, a devalua-
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then such a strategy requires that developed countries run corresponding trade
decits, which may beyond some point become unsustainable. Thus the strat-
egy of export-led growth, when universally followed by developing countries, is
likely to yield diminishing returns.
The recent global nancial crisis has served to highlight the adding up con-
straint. For this constraint becomes even more relevant if, as widely expected,
developed countries grow at a slower pace or are less willing to run trade decits
following the recent global nancial crisis. Put di¤erently, shrinking global im-
balances in the near future may make it much harder, if not impossible, for
a large group of developing countries to pursue growth based on exporting to
developed countries. Indeed, another look at Figure 1 indicates that current
account imbalances, have begun to shrink since the onset of global economic
di¢ culties in 2007. Others, such as Rodrik [2009], have noted, however, that
Asian growth successes were based on broader tradable sector growth rather
than solely on exports. Before we can evaluate prospects for the future, there-
fore, it would be helpful to evaluate the past. In particular, we need to clarify
terms such as export-led growthand tradable-led growth.
The term export-led growthhas traditionally been understood in a Key-
nesian framework, whereby positive net exports or trade surpluses generate a
source of demand for domestic output, and hence cause output growth. It is
in this sense that the idea of an adding-up constraint makes sense. A log-
ical corollary is that slower growth of demand and greater reluctance to run
trade decits in developed countries will make it harder for developing coun-
tries to pursue this kind of a growth strategy. We will call this strategy the
net export-led growth strategy, or NEXLG strategy. A related strand in the
Post Keynesian tradition, originating with Thirlwall [1979], points to the role of
the balance of payments constraint in constraining output growth. Thus, while
trade is assumed to be balanced in the long run, exports play the crucial role of
facilitating growth by relaxing the balance of payments constraint. Relaxation
of this constraint, in turn, facilitates imports of the investment and intermedi-
ate goods required for output growth. To the extent that trade surpluses or
limited trade decits must precede growth, the implications are similar to those
underlying the NEXLG strategy.
As discussed in the next section, a more recent strand of literature, inspired
in large part by Melitz [2003], has emphasized the role of exports as harbingers
of productivity growth. The hypothesis is that greater international competi-
tion, international knowledge spillovers, economies of scale, and other relevant
externalities make exports a vehicle for technological change and, hence, eco-
nomic growth. What makes exports special in this case is not any external
account-related consideration but rather the presence of externalities associated
with the process of exporting. Thus the emphasis shifts to supply-side fac-
tors. Since the kinds of externalities discussed above are generally associated
with manufactured exports, we refer to this hypothesis as the manufactured
tion will translate into a deterioration in the terms of trade. In logical terms, the simultaneous
pursuit of export-led growth by a number of small developing countries becomes analogous to
the large country case.
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export-led growth strategy or the MEXLG strategy.
Another distinct hypothesis is that of what we call tradable sector-led growth
or TSLG. Rodrik [2008], for example, argues that the tradable sector, which
in developing countries is associated mainly with manufactures, is typically af-
icted with market failures and institutional weaknesses to a greater extent,
leading these countries to devote a sub-optimal proportion of their resources to
this sector. Second-best policies to subsidize tradable production, therefore,
could promote growth.
Finally, a consideration that has received much less attention is the possibil-
ity that all exports may not be created equal. Insofar as knowledge spillovers,
technology transfer, and adoption of new management techniques are more likely
to result from manufactured exports to developed countries, growth may also
potentially be a function of the proportion of a countrys manufactured exports
destined for industrialized country markets. Developed country rms, may in
addition, pursue vertical foreign direct investment in low labor cost developing
countries in order to use them as platforms for relatively sophisticated exports to
industrialized countries, facilitating technology transfer and productivity growth
in the process . We refer to this as the industrialized country-centered export-led
growth strategy, or IEXLG.
The four growth strategies listed above have di¤erent implications for the
post-crisis prospects for developing countries. In particular, the degree to
which a global environment in which trade imbalances shrink could hamper
a continuation of pre-crisis growth strategies depends on the nature of these
strategies. Table 1 lays out a schematic summary of these implications. The
NEXLG strategy will face greater adding-up constraints in a post-crisis world
if global growth is slower, and if developed countries experience smaller trade
decits. The MEXLG and TSLG strategies, by contrast, may not face that
constraint since external imbalances are not a factor. Thus, the distinction be-
tween NEXLG on the one hand and TSLG and MEXLG on the other becomes
an interesting issue. Succinctly put, developing Asia can continue to pursue
TSLG but not NEXLG in a world with zero global imbalances. Moreover, the
distinction between NEXLG and TSLG renders the composition of demand for
domestic tradables important. For example, if there is something special about
exports, then lowering wages may help the pursuit of the MEXLG strategy by
freeing up domestic tradables for export. If, on the other hand, it is the en-
tire tradable/industrial sector that is special, then lowering wages would simply
shift the composition of demand from domestic to foreign sources, or, in the
event that foreign demand does not displace domestic demand, may even ham-
per growth by lowering demand for domestically produced tradables.5 Finally,
the fact that it is the industrialized countries that are expected to shrink their
overall trade decits in the post-crisis world has an interesting implication for
the post-crisis world. Since positive net exports provide a boost to demand re-
gardless of destination, at least some countries could continue pursuing NEXLG
5This could happen, for example, if the propensity to save out of prots is higher than
that out of wages, as is often assumed in the Kaleckian framework.
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by substituting trade surpluses with other developing countries for those with
developed countries. However, if the destination matters, say because exports
to developed countries bring with them more knowledge spillovers and tech-
nological improvements to meet higher product standards, then lower export
growth to these countries will hamper continuation of pre-crisis growth.
Continuing along a similar vein, a region that has pursued MEXLG will not
be a¤ected in a post-crisis world characterized by zero imbalances if that state
is arrived at through higher imports into that region, but it will be negatively
a¤ected if that state is achieved via reduced exports to the rest of the world.
To take another example, a region will be a¤ected negatively by slower devel-
oped country growth in a post crisis world if that region pursued IEXLG, but
not necessarily if it pursued MEXLG and can replace exports to industrialized
countries with those to other developing countries.
This paper empirically investigates the future of pre-crisis growth strategies
by attempting to identify the nature of those strategies. Specically, we try
to econometrically distinguish between NEXLG, MEXLG, IEXLG, and TSLG
using panel data for pre-crisis years. Given that export-led growth among non-
commodity exporters is mainly associated with Asian countries in general, and
East/South East Asian ones in particular, we focus on these countries.
We contribute to the existing literature on export-led growth and global
rebalancing by distinguishing between these four growth strategies, identifying
historically the most relevant ones for Asia, and thereby drawing conclusions for
the future. Most interestingly, perhaps, we nd that the proportion of an Asian
developing countrys exports that are destined for industrialized countries has a
statistically robust positive e¤ect on output growth, and that this positive e¤ect
may work through investment and imports of capital goods. This variable,
to our knowledge, has not received much attention in existing literature as a
determinant of growth.
Section 2 provides an overview of the main issues and related literature. The
next two sections develop the empirical strategy and present the econometric
estimates. Section 5 concludes.
2 Literature Review
The recent international nancial crisis has served as a big shock to the global
trade and nancial architecture. As illustrated by Figure 2, Asian countries
in particular had enjoyed rapid growth and trade surpluses in the years leading
to the crisis. Due to the unbalanced nature of our panel, we display the
means of our variables of interest.6 The gure highlights the trade surpluses
that accompanied growth following the Asian crisis of the late nineties. Also
interesting is the upward evolution, since the late seventies, of manufactured
exports as a proportion of GDP and that of the proportion of manufactured
exports destined for industrialized countries. The size of the industrial sector
6More details about the composition of our sample follow in Section 3.
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as a proportion of GDP has, on the other hand, stayed more or less the same
since the mid-eighties.
The rapid growth in the years leading up to 2007 was widely perceived as
having been based on surging exports. Especially impressive in this regard
has been the sustained growth in China over the last three decades which has
existed alongside huge current account surpluses in recent years. The logical
corollary is that, given that developed countries are likely to grow at a slower
pace following the crisis, and that countries with big decits will increasingly
resort to direct or indirect protectionist measures, the pre-crisis model of growth
based on exporting manufactures to developed countries may have outlived its
utility.7
Discussion of the sustainability of the growth model cannot be separated
from that of the nature of the growth model. Traditionally export-led growth
has been interpreted to mean trade surplus- or net export-led growth. Net ex-
ports serve as a source of demand for domestic output, and hence, in a demand-
led growth framework, as a source of growth. The origins of the idea can of
course be traced back to mercantilist literature from the pre-industrial revo-
lution era. In its more modern form, it is most closely associated with the
Keynesian framework of demand-led growth.
Export-led growth based on trade surpluses is subject to the fallacy of com-
position or adding up critique that becomes particularly relevant in the post-
crisis world where a shortage of international demand originating from devel-
oped countries is likely. Such a constraint could either show up in the form
of the crowding out of some countriesexports by other countries, or, relatedly,
in the shape of deteriorating terms of trade for developing country exporters.
Evidence on the existence of a fallacy of composition has thus far been sugges-
tive although not conclusive. For example, based on panel data estimates for
22 major developing country exporters of manufacturers, Razmi [2007] nds the
presence of signicant demand-side constraints on export growth. Furthermore,
the estimates suggest that rapid Chinese export growth has had a signicant im-
pact in this regard. Eichengreen et al. [2007] conrm the tendency for Chinas
exports to crowd out those of other Asian countries but nd a di¤erence in the
impact of China on low income versus middle and high income Asian countries.
This is because the e¤ect is felt mainly in markets for consumer goods which
are exported by lower income Asian countries. Chinas simultaneous tendency
to absorb large volumes of capital good imports from its Asian neighbors, on
the other hand, has beneted the more advanced Asian economies.
A di¤erent basis for export-led growth was o¤ered by a strand of literature
following Feder [1983]. This literature has developed the theoretical under-
pinnings for the inclusion of exports as an explanatory variable in a traditional
growth framework with a production function. In Feders two sector model, the
output of the non-export sector depends not only on the factors of production
(labor and capital) but also on exports. This captures the externality associ-
ated with factors unique to exports such as higher quality labor, internationally
7See, for example, the discussions in UNCTAD [2010] and Adams and Park [2009].
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competitive management, etc. Moreover, the marginal product of factors in
the export sector is greater than that in the non-export sector. Thus, ex-
ports, from this perspective, can potentially inuence productivity and growth
independently of their impact on the external balance.
More recently, several studies following Melitz [2003], have analyzed the
relationship between rm heterogeneity, trade, and exports at a more micro
level. A relevant empirical nding is that exporting rms tend, on average,
to be larger and more productive. This suggests either that more productive
rms self-select into export markets (due to extra costs imposed by the process of
exporting), and/or that rms that export become more productive. The latter
may happen due to several reasons such as economies of scale, dynamic learning,
technological spillovers, and competitive pressures. Pack [2001], for example,
notes that international competition allowed purchasers abroad to exert heavy
pressure on East Asian exporters, producing under contract, to cut costs and
increase e¢ ciency. Exporting rms may have easier access to new technologies
thanks to their international links. Moreover, exporting rms may receive
technical guidance on how to meet higher quality standards from their clients in
importing countries. Easier transfer of managerial skills may also be a factor.
While empirical evidence for self-selection tends to be quite robust, that for
learning-by-exporting appears to be signicant only for developing countries.
This is not surprising since these countries tend to be farther away from the
technological frontier, and hence have greater scope for learning.
Other recent studies too have pointed to the potentially special nature of
exports. For example, Cypher and Dietz [2008] provide a discussion of the
domestic technological learning capacity that arises from exporting manufac-
tures. In an econometric study of nine African countries, Van Biesebroeck
[2005] nds evidence that manufactured exports facilitate productivity growth.
The study shows that the presence of scale economies plays an important role in
this regard. Credit constraints and contract enforcement issues prevent rms
that only produce for the domestic market from fully exploiting this channel.
These problems are likely to be more relevant for developing countries, as are
the potential gains from imitation.8
The special nature of the tradable sector, which in developing countries con-
sists mainly of the manufacturing and agriculture sectors, need not be limited
to exports, however. Rodrik [2008] presents an AK-type model of endogenous
8De Loecker [2007] nds in an empirical study of the Slovenian manufacturing sector that
export entrants become more productive once they start exporting. In a study of British
manufacturing rms, Greenaway and Kneller [2007] nd that exporting rms experience pro-
ductivity growth relative to non-exporters. Moreover, the magnitude of divergence across
industries appears to be driven by di¤erences in the scope for learning. The export e¤ect is
greater, for example, if the distance to the technological frontier is large. Thus, the export
e¤ect should generally be larger for low income countries. Among other recent studies, see
also Hiep and Ohta [2009] for the case of Vietnamese manufacturing rms, Mahadevan [2007]
for Malaysia, and Ogunleye and Ayeni [2008] for Nigeria, and Park et al. [2009] for China.
Wagner [2007], Pedro and Yang [2009], and Silva et al. [2010] present comprehensive surveys
of studies of the learning-by-exporting channel. Lall [1998] and Lall [2000] provide insightful
discussions of the manufacturing export-development nexus in developing countries from a
more macro perspective.
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growth in which the tradable sector is special in the sense that it is characterized
to a greater degrees by institutional weaknesses and market failures (informa-
tion and coordination externalities), leading to a bias against this sector in the
allocation of resources. Second-best policies to subsidize tradable production,
therefore, could promote growth.9
In a recent contribution that perhaps comes closest to the spirit of our paper,
Rodrik [2009] tests the tradable-led and the export-led growth hypotheses by
running a horse race between the industrial share of GDP (used as a proxy for
the size of the tradable sector) and the exports to GDP ratio on the one hand
and the former and trade surpluses as a proportion of GDP on the other. The
panel data consists of both developed and developing countries. The paper
nds evidence that the industrial share of GDP matters more, especially for
developing countries. However, since it is manufactured exports that are more
likely to be the source of learning and knowledge spillovers, the manufactured
exports to GDP ratio seems to be the more relevant variable, and this is the
variable that we employ in our analysis.
Finally, we end this section with a brief look at another issue that is directly
relevant to post-crisis prospects for developing countries. Some literature has
suggested that the emerging economies in Asia and elsewhere have decoupled
from the developed world, and are, therefore, immune to slower growth in the
latter. Noting the growth in South-South trade, Canuto et al. [2010], discuss the
possible evolution of a new version of export-led growth, in which South-South
trade picks up the slack through middle income countries importing more from
low-income ones. The authors term this scenario export-led growth v2.0.
This, however, raises a new set of questions. Since it is the developed coun-
tries that are expected to limit their trade decits in the post-crisis years, is
there anything special about exporting to these countries? In other words,
is learning-by-exporting more signicant in the case of exports to developed
countries, perhaps due to the presence of more stringent product quality expec-
tations, a greater proportion of more sophisticated manufactured products in
the basket, more technical guidance from client rms, or other factors? Indeed,
existing literature does provide some supportive evidence in this regard. For ex-
ample, Pack [2001] notes that export-oriented production encouraged East Asian
countries to move toward more sophisticated technology to meet the complex
contractual requirements from Western industrial countries. De Loecker [2007]
nds that productivity gains from exporting are greater for rms exporting to
high income countries.10 If this is the case, a (post-crisis) Export-Led Growth
v2.0, which involves other developing countries replacing developed countries as
export destinations, may not be a good substitute for (pre-crisis) Export-Led
Growth v1.0.
We probe these issues empirically in the next section.
9See also Razmi et al. [2011] for a model of an economy that features tradable-led growth
in an environment of underemployment of labor resources.
10See also Pedro and Yang [2009] and Silva et al. [2010].
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3 Data and Econometric strategy
We begin with a baseline regression of the form:














iProportion_X_Developedjt i + ft + fj + "jt (1)
The dependent variable is the average annual rate of real (chained) GDP
per capita growth, RGDPCHit 1 (real GDP per capita in the previous pe-
riod) captures the convergence term, ft time specic e¤ects, fj country spe-
cic e¤ects, while "it is the error term. Real GDP growth was obtained from
the Penn World Tables version 7. The GDP share of industry is denoted by
Indus_Prop_GDP . Following Rodrik [2009], among other studies, we use this
as a proxy for the size of the tradable sector. The variable TB_Prop_GDP
represents the trade balance as a proportion of GDP, and captures the e¤ects
of net exports on growth. Manufactured exports, i.e., exports of SITC cate-
gories 5, 6, 7, and 8, as a proportion of GDP is represented by the variable
Manuf_X_GDP . Data for these four variables were obtained from the
World Banks World Development Indicators (WDI) online database. Finally,
Proportion_X_Developed is the proportion of manufactured exports destined
for developed countries. Data for the construction of this variable were obtained
from the United Nations COMTRADE database.
Our sample consists of a maximum of 44 Asian developing countries, 20 in-
dustrialized countries, and the time period 1953-2009, although data are avail-
able for shorter intervals for some of the series. In order to remove short-run
cyclical e¤ects, we use data averaged over three year intervals.11 Table 2 pro-
vides a data dictionary along with a list of the countries included in the sample.
We pursue a general-to-specic estimation strategy, which is particularly useful
given our limited sample size. In each case, we rst estimate the most general
form based on equation (1). The variables that are not signicant at the 10
percent level are then eliminated in a step-wise manner.
Some of the variables in our sample could potentially be endogenous in the
sense that these are jointly determined with the dependent variable. For ex-
ample, the share of industry in the economy may not be exogenous to the GDP
growth rate. Moreover, some of the variables are likely to exhibit hysteresis
11 Ideally we would have liked to use 5 year periods but the sample size constrains our choice.
The 3 year average for GRGDPCH, a variable in growth rate form, was calculated using the
following formula:
GRGDPCH = [(RGDPCHt=RGDPCHt 1)^(1=3)]  1
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or persistence over time. To address the robustness of our baseline OLS esti-
mates to potential endogeneity/simultaneity issues, we therefore, carry out dy-
namic panel estimations using the Arellano-Bover General Method of Moments
(GMM) approach. We specify the second and third lags of the dependent
variable as instruments in addition to the third lags of Indus_Prop_GDP ,
TB_Prop_GDP , Manuf_X_GDP , and Proportion_X_Developed. Con-
sistent with our OLS strategy, we specify time and cross-section e¤ects, and
pursue a more parsimonious specication based on eliminating variables that
are not statistically signicant. The Sargan test of overidentifying restrictions
is employed to test the validity of our instruments.
It may be warranted here to re-visit the choice of our main variables of inter-
est, as included in equation (1). Our focus is on exploring the nature of Asias
growth strategy. More specically, whether Asian growth can be identied ei-
ther as tradable-led or export-led (or both), and, if so, what implications does
the past pattern of growth have for a future in which slower developed country
growth translates into less global demand. The motivation behind the inclusion
of a proxy for the tradable sector is obvious in light of the discussion in Section
1. If, as Rodrik [2009] argues, pre-crisis Asian growth was tradable-led, then
subsidies for tradable production for domestic consumption may be good sub-
stitutes for global demand in terms of boosting growth. If, however, pre-crisis
growth was export-led, then this may not be true and shrinking global imbal-
ances and/or reduced global demand become more serious concerns. The trade
balance as a proportion of GDP captures Keynesian demand-side net export-
led growth stimulus. As discussed in Section 1, this is only one channel and
perhaps not the most important one at that through which exports could fa-
cilitate growth, and exports, especially manufactured ones, could be special for
other reasons. This provides the grounds for including manufactured exports as
a proportion of GDP and the proportion of manufactured exports destined for
developed countries as explanatory variables. If exports to industrialized coun-
tries feature the benets and positive externalities associated with knowledge
spillovers, competition, learning-by-exporting, and quality control to a greater
degree, then more limited demand from these countries in the post-crisis envi-
ronment could become a signicant constraint on developing country growth.
Table 3 provides summary statistics for the variables of primary interest.
Figure 3 shows the corresponding distributions with the help of histograms.
Asia had an impressive mean growth rate of 3 per cent per year in real
GDP per capita. The series ranges from a minimum of -23.5 percent (Lebanon,
1989-91) to a maximum of 20.8 percent (Azerbaijan, 2007-09). The latter is
the only observation greater than 16 percent. An overwhelming majority of the
observations lie between 5 percent.
Industry as a proportion of GDP ranges from a minimum of 7.7 percent
(Hong Kong, 2007-09) to a maximum of 90.2 percent (Brunei Darussalam, 1974-
76), with a mean of 34.7 percent.12 Most of the observations lie within the 20-45




The distribution of manufactured exports as a percentage of GDP is much
more skewed with most values clustered in the 0-10 percent range and very few
beyond 50 percent. The full range extends from a minimum of 0.002 percent
(Maldives, 2007-09) to 151.2 percent (Hong Kong, 2004-06). Moreover there
is a signicant di¤erence between the mean (16.6 percent) and the median (6.7
percent), indicating that a relatively small number of countries pulls the average
up. Only a few values lie above the 60 percent level.
The trade balance as a proportion of GDP is centered around zero percent,
as one would expect. The highest number of values lies between negative 5
percent to zero. The values between negative and positive 40 percent almost
entirely exhaust the observations, although Lebanon in 1989-91 had a trade
decit of 75.4 percent while Brunei Darussalam in 1977-79 had a trade surplus
of 80 percent. The mean is a trade decit of 0.23 percent although the median
(-1.93 percent) suggests that a relatively small number of countries with large
surpluses characterizes the series.13
The proportion of manufactured exports that is destined for developed coun-
tries ranges from almost zero for Bhutan in 2004-06 to almost 100 percent for
Maldives in 2004-06. The former is a landlocked country that exports almost
exclusively to its South Asian neighbors India and Bangladesh. Very few val-
ues lie outside the 0-60 percent range. The mean is almost 31 percent. Since
Japan itself is an Asian country, albeit a high income industrialized one, we
exclude it from the list of industrialized countries while calculating the series
Proportion_X_Developed. As a robustness test, we also then estimate re-
gressions with Japan included among the industrialized countries, and show
that such a change does not qualitatively a¤ect our results. Including Japan,
however, raises the mean of this series to 37 percent. Moreover, the inclusion
of Japan makes 50-60% the most populated segment of the distribution.
Returning to our econometric analysis, once we have explored the nature of
Asian growth in the past, we add additional control variables to assess the ro-
bustness of our results. Next, we briey explore possible channels through which
various factors could have fostered growth. We focus on gross xed capital for-
mation (as a proportion of GDP) and capital goods imports (as a proportion of
total imports). Investment is a channel that is widely associated with growth
and technological progress, especially in the Asian case.14 Moreover, imports of
sophisticated capital goods (mainly from industrialized countries) often consti-
tute a necessary (but not su¢ cient) condition for technological upgrading and
productivity growth.
13There was one value that was so implausibly high that we excluded it from the outset.
The trade decit to GDP ratio for Kazakhstan was reported as 10,133 percent for 1989-91!




Columns (1)-(3) of Table 4 present the results of our baseline OLS regressions,
proceeding from the most general form based on equation (1) to more spe-
cic/parsimonious specications based on the strategy discussed earlier. The
upper half of the table reports the individual coe¢ cient estimates while the
lower half details the summed coe¢ cients along with their statistical signi-
cance (where applicable, i.e., only in the cases where more than one of the
contemporary and lagged instances of a variable form part of the reported
specication). Consistent with standard expectations, the convergence term
(LRGDPCHT ) has a negative sign and is generally signicant at the 1 percent
level.15 The most general form in column (1) has few signicant coe¢ cients
(the contemporary coe¢ cient of Indus_Pr op_GDP , the rst lagged coe¢ cient
of Manuf_X_GDP , and the second lagged coe¢ cients of Manuf_X_GDP
and Proportion_X_Developed). This is perhaps due to the number of lags
specied which limits an already somewhat small panel. Column (2) reports es-
timates for the more specic form. Only the contemporary and lagged instances
of Indus_Pr op_GDP and the twice-lagged Proportion_X_Developed sur-
vive. Thus, the latter variable tends to e¤ect growth with two lags. Moreover,
the Wald test indicates that the summed coe¢ cient of Indus_Pr op_GDP is
not signicant at the 10 percent level. None of the instances of the other two
variables TB_Pr op_GDP and Manuf_X_GDP have a statistically signi-
cant e¤ect on output growth.
Column (3) reports the results of a regression similar to that reported in
column (2), but with the lagged instance of Industry_Prop_GDP eliminated.
The contemporary coe¢ cient on this variable is positive and signicant. The
coe¢ cient on the twice lagged instance of Proportion_X_Developed is still
positive and signicant, and somewhat larger in magnitude.
In order to facilitate comparison, column (4) presents the standardized co-
e¢ cients based on the specic regression in Column (2). The combined long-
run e¤ect (sum of coe¢ cients), with a summed value of 0.246, is larger for
Industry_Prop_GDP , although recall that the Wald test for joint signicance
indicates that it is not signicant at the 10 percent level. Thus, the proportion
of total exports to developed countries appears as the only signicant variable.
A one standard deviation variation in this variable boosts growth by 0.175 stan-
dard deviations.
Columns (5) and (6) present the results of the robustness tests using the
GMM approach, as described earlier. With this approach, we can address
persistence by including the lagged dependent variable.16 Column (5) reports
15This remains true for most of the regressions reported below, although the magnitude of
the estimated e¤ect varies.
16The inclusion of the lagged dependent variable as a regressor means that the long-run
coe¢ cient for each variable now is the sum of coe¢ cients on that variable divided by one
minus the coe¢ cient on the lagged dependent variable.
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the most general regression, which again yields very few signicant variables.17
Moving to the more parsimonious regression reported in column (6), again, the
second lag of Proportion_X_Developed turns out to be signicant, and the
e¤ect is larger than in the OLS case. The rst lag of Industry_Prop_GDP is
barely signicant at the 10 percent level but appears with a negative sign and a
small coe¢ cient. Interestingly, rst and second lags of Manuf_X_GDP now
become individually signicant, although the Wald test indicates that the sum
of the two variables can be rejected at traditional levels of signicance. The
Sargan tests of overidentifying restrictions, reported for all three regressions, do
not raise any concerns at the 5 percent level of signicance.
In sum, both the OLS and GMM approaches suggest that, of the variables in-
cluded in our benchmark regression, only the second lag of Proportion_X_Developed
has had a positive and signicant long-run e¤ect on per capita GDP growth in
Asian countries. The coe¢ cient on this variable is larger in the GMM re-
gressions. The role of the share of industry in GDP is less clear, with the
standardized OLS estimates showing a positive e¤ect that is larger than that of
Proportion_X_Developed, but is jointly insignicant. The trade balance as
a proportion of GDP does not appear to e¤ect growth in any of the regressions.
4.2 Taking the Asian crisis into account
As is well known, the Asian crisis of 1997-99, which began with a speculative
run on the Thai Baht and quickly spread to other parts of Asia had a negative
impact on income and employment. Does this e¤ect show up in our data? To
explore this dimension more directly,18 we re-ran the baseline regressions with
a dummy for the period 1998-2000. Time xed e¤ects were now excluded from
the model in equation (1) for obvious reasons. Again, we estimated using both
OLS and GMM techniques. Table 5 summarizes the results. As expected, the
Asian crisis had a negative and signicant impact on Asian growth regardless
of the estimation technique. The coe¢ cient on this dummy variable ranges
from -0.02 to -0.04. Industry as a proportion of GDP has a negative e¤ect,
although it is statistically insignicant in the OLS case. There is a positive and
signicant positive contemporary e¤ect which is more than o¤set by the lagged
e¤ect. Interestingly enough, the inclusion of the dummy increases the impact of
the second lag of Proportion_X_Developed. This is true for both the OLS and
GMM estimates, although the latter yields a larger coe¢ cient (compare columns
(2) and (6) of Table 4 with columns (2) and (4) of Table 5, respectively). In
qualitative terms, the only di¤erence from the baseline regression is that the
second lag of the trade balance too now becomes signicant, indicating that
trade surpluses have a positive impact on future growth. Again, this is true
regardless of the estimation technique.
17Notice that we are down to 149 observations in this case.
18Notice that the time xed e¤ects in earlier specications should capture this Asia-wide
shock. In our baseline regression, the time xed e¤ect is the largest for the period 1998-2000,
and is -0.025 in magnitude.
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4.3 Including Japan
We mentioned earlier that we excluded Japan from the list of industrialized
countries while calculating the variable Proportion_X_Developed. Exports
to Japan have been a major area of growth for East and South East Asian coun-
tries in particular, but also other Asian developing countries in general. Are
our estimates robust to the inclusion of Japan in the list of developed countries?
Table 6 addresses this question. Starting with the estimates derived with-
out controlling for the Asian crisis (columns (1) and (2)), notice rst that the
second lag of Proportion_X_Developed continues to be positively and signi-
cantly associated with growth (see column(2)). Second, Industry_Prop_GDP
too has a positive e¤ect, but just as in the baseline case (column (2) of Ta-
ble 4), the overall e¤ect is statistically insignicant. The other two vari-
ables representing the trade balance and the manufactured exports share of
GDP continue to be insignicant, as in the baseline case. The inclusion of a
dummy variable for the Asian crisis increases the positive e¤ect of (twice lagged)
Proportion_X_Developed, and, as in the case of Table 5, also renders the ef-
fect of the trade balance positive and signicant, but the other results remain
qualitatively the same. Reassuringly, the inclusion of Japan does not appear
to a¤ect our results much.
4.4 Regional and Temporal Asymmetries
Much of the debate surrounding global imbalances and export-led growth has
involved the East Asian tigers and the South East Asian export dynamos that
followed their lead in what is sometimes called a ying geeseformation. Do
these countries behave di¤erently than the rest of Asia in terms of our main
variables of interest? In order to explore this possibility, we divided the sample
into East and South East (ESE) countries on the one hand and the rest of Asia
(ROA) on the other. Columns (1)-(4) of Table 7 summarize the estimates
derived for these groups. Focusing again on the parsimonious form estimates
(columns (2) and (4)), there is some evidence of di¤ering behavior. While the
industry share of GDP and the proportion of exports destined for industrialized
countries both play a positive and statistically signicant role in boosting real
per capita GDP growth in the ESE countries, that appears not to be the case for
the ROA countries, where only the coe¢ cient on the former variable is positive
and signicant. As is generally the case with our previous regressions, the trade
balance and share of manufactured exports are either insignicant and/or have a
negative impact on output growth. Thus, the main nding reported by Rodrik
[2009], that is, the existence of a positive association between the share of the
industrial/tradable sector holds for both groups of countries. However, we nd
that, for East and South East Asian countries at least, the proportion of exports
destined for industrialized countries too is an important driver of growth. These
results provide some suggestive evidence for the widely perceived export- and
tradable-led basis of East and South East Asian growth.
Columns (5)-(8) present results for regressions run with the sample period
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split into two overlapping periods, 1953-1995 and 1989-2009. The periods
were allowed to overlap in order to have evenly split and reasonably large sub-
samples.19 Our general nding that the proportion of exports sold in industri-
alized country markets is robustly and positively associated with output growth
holds only for the second sub-period (again, as always, with two lags). For
the rst sub-period, however, Industry_Prop_GDP and Manuf_X_GDP
are signicantly and positively associated with growth. The trade balance
variable is negative and insignicant in both cases. Thus, the proportion of
exports destined for industrialized countries appears to have mattered only in
recent decades. Given the small sizes of the sub-samples, however, this evidence
should only be seen as suggestive and preliminary.
4.5 Excluding outliers
Table 8 addresses potential concerns raised by the presence of outliers. One
such concern is that our results could be driven by a handful of high income oil
exporting countries. Suppose, for example, that commodity exporters have, on
average, a lower proportion of exports destined for developed countries. Since
some of these countries are high income, and since high income countries may,
on average, grow slower, this introduces a bias in favor of nding a positive
impact of Proportion_X_Developed. Figure 4 highlights this concern. The
points to the right of the 50,000 level of real per capita GDP almost exclusively
represent observations for Qatar and Brunei Darussalam, two relatively small
oil and gas exporting countries. Moreover, these two countries have a relatively
low proportion of exports destined for developed countries. Notice rst that
his concern should be addressed in principle by our inclusion of a convergence
term. Second, as seen in Figure 5, the negative correlation between RGDPCH
and Proportion_X_Developed almost vanishes once we restrict the sample to
countries below the $20,000 threshold of real per capita GDP. Re-running our
OLS regression with this more limited sample delivers results similar to our
baseline regression that includes all data points (compare column (2) of Table 4
and column (2) of Table 8). One somewhat minor di¤erence is that, the rst and
second lags of Manuf_X_GDP now survive the reduction to a parsimonious
form, although their sum is negative and jointly insignicant (as indicated by
Wald tests).20 The only other di¤erence is that the contemporary and lagged
coe¢ cients of Industry_Prop_GDP now become jointly signicant at the 10
percent level (and remain positively signed). Thus both the proportion of
exports to industrialized countries and the GDP share of the industrial sector
now become positive and statistically signicant determinants of per capital
output growth.
As discussed earlier, and as highlighted by Figure 3, a few small open
19Much less data are available for the earlier period so that even though it spans more years,
the number of observations is almost the same as the second sub-period.
20We also ran regressions with interaction terms to explore whether the impact of
Pr oportion_X_Developed varies with real per capita GDP. The interaction terms were
found to be insignicant.
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economies in our sample (mainly Singapore and Hong Kong but also Macao
and Malaysia) have exceptionally high proportions of manufactured exports as
a share of GDP. Could these historically fast growing economies be driving
our results? Columns (3) and (4) of Table 8 present the estimates derived
once we limit the sample to values of Manuf_X_GDP less than or equal to
60 percent. Again the results are very similar to our baseline OLS regres-
sion, the Wald test of joint signicance indicating that the summed coe¢ cient
on Indus_Pr op_GDP is insignicant (compare column (2) of Table 4 and
column (4) of Table 8). The coe¢ cients on Proportion_X_Developed are
identical in magnitude (and signicant) in both cases.
Finally, we noticed while discussing Figure 3 that a few countries export
almost entirely to developed countries. Could these countries be driving our
results? To investigate this aspect, we re-estimate our baseline growth equation
after excluding data points with Pr oportion_X_GDP greater than 60 percent.
Columns (5) and (6) of Table 8 present the results. Once again the estimates
are very similar to those derived for the full sample (see column (2) of Table 4).
The summed coe¢ cient of Industry_Prop_GDP is not statistically signicant,
leaving Proportion_X_Developed as the only signicant and positive inuence
on real per capita GDP growth.
4.6 Controlling for Possible Omitted Inuences
So far we have investigated factors that could help us gauge prospects for the fu-
ture of tradable- and export-led growth in Asia. We found Proportion_X_Developed
to be the most robust correlate of growth. Now we briey explore the e¤ects
of other control variables that are typically included in growth regressions as
determinants of growth. We add twice lagged values of four variables to a base-
line regression: (1) openness (OPENC), as measured by the ratio of the sum of
exports and imports to GDP, (2) savings as a proportion of GDP (SAV_GDP ),
government expenditure as a proportion of GDP (GG), and the terms of trade
(TOT ). The use of twice lagged instances is designed to avoid endogeneity
problems.21 Data for TOT , GG, and SAV_GDP came from the WDI while
that for OPENC was obtained from the Penn World Tables (version 7). We
pursue the GMM approach to address the presence of lagged GRGDPCH on
the right hand side. Also, we only introduce one control variable at a time in
order to conserve degrees of freedom.
Table 9 summarizes the results. Positive terms of trade shocks and an
increase in the saving to GDP ratio have a small positive e¤ect on output growth,
although both are statistically indistinguishable from zero. Greater openness
has a small negative e¤ect, although again it is statistically insignicant. The
coe¢ cient on government spending is small, negative, and signicant. The
coe¢ cient on our main variable of interest, i.e., Proportion_X_Developed,
21For example, Pr op_X_Developedt 2 could a¤ect the degree of openness in the next
period, which could then have a positive impact on growth. The variable underlying growth
would still be the proportion of exports destined for industrialized countries but some of this
e¤ect will now indirectly show up as a positive coe¢ cient on the savings to GDP ratio.
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remains positive and statistically signicant with one exception. It becomes
insignicant when the terms of trade variable is included. This latter result
may be driven by the small sample size (recall that the terms of trade variable
is insignicant too; we only have terms of trade data post-1980).
4.7 Potential channels for capital accumulation and tech-
nological progress
The East Asian growth model has often been associated with not only rapid
export growth but also high investment. Indeed, some analysts have termed
rapid Asian growth as export- and investment-led. The investment angle may
be particularly important if capital goods, especially sophisticated ones, em-
body technological progress. It could, for instance, be the case that countries
that export more manufactures to industrialized countries have to ensure higher
quality through investment in domestic and imported capital goods. As a pre-
liminary step toward exploring these possibilities, we estimate a regression of
the following form:
Xit = 





















where, depending on the equation estimated,X denotes eitherGFCF_Pr op_GDP
(xed capital formation as a proportion of GDP) or K_Pr op_Total_ Im ports
(capital goods imports as a proportion of total imports). Table 10 provides the
estimation results for the specic equation in both non-standardized and stan-
dardized forms (columns (1) and (3), and columns (2) and (4), respectively).
A look at column (1) suggests that a positive trade balance is negatively as-
sociated with investment as a proportion of GDP, although the twice lagged
instance has a small positive e¤ect. The negative contemporary e¤ect, which
dominates, may indicate the heavy imported good content of Asian growth.
Not surprisingly, industry as a proportion of GDP has a positive and signicant
impact on investment. Much less recognized in existing literature is the posi-
tive and signicant e¤ect on investment of the share of exports to industrialized
countries. This is consistent with the hypothesis that exports to industrial-
ized countries require more sophisticated production processes, and hence more
investment. A look at the standardized coe¢ cients in column (2) indicates
that the normalized e¤ect of the industrial share of GDP is greater than that
of Proportion_X_Developed.
Column (4) presents the parsimonious form estimates withK_Prop_Imports
as the dependent variable. Somewhat surprisingly, industry as a proportion of
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GDP does not appear to signicantly a¤ect the proportion of capital goods im-
ported. However, the share of manufactured exports does have a positive and
signicant impact. Moreover, the lagged value of the trade balance and the
proportion of exports destined for industrialized countries have important roles
to play too, in terms of both statistical signicance and economic magnitude.
This latter nding provides more empirical support for the hypothesis that ex-
ports to industrialized countries require more advance production processes that
typically require imported capital goods.
In sum, Table 10 provides suggestive evidence for at least two channels under-
lying the positive e¤ect of Proportion_X_Developed on growth. This variable
appears to have a positive relationship to both investment as a proportion of
GDP and the share of capital goods in total imports.
5 Conclusions and Implications
Our e¤ort involves a rather ambitious question; is it likely that Asian countries
will be able to pursue the pre-crisis patterns of rapid growth? To help tackle this
question, one rst needs to establish the characteristics of pre-crisis growth. We
have attempted to explore the trade- and export-related characteristics. More
specically, to what extent was Asian growth tradable sector-led, net export-
led, or export-led in some other sense. As we have stressed, the answers have
implications for a future in which industrialized countries are likely to grow at
a slower pace and global external account imbalances are likely to shrink.
We ran a series of growth regressions to derive OLS and GMM estimates,
to test robustness for sub-samples and to the exclusion of outliers, to control
for possible inuences missing from our benchmark regressions, and to explore
possible transmission channels. Our main nding is that, among our variables
of interest, the proportion of total Asian country exports destined for indus-
trialized countries is the most robust correlate of real per capita GDP growth.
The industrial share of GDP, used as a proxy for the size of the tradable sector,
is positively associated with growth too  indeed the standardized coe¢ cient
in the baseline regression is larger than that for the share of exports destined
for industrialized countries but the overall e¤ect is statistically insignicant in
most cases. The other two variables of interest, that is, the share of manufac-
tured exports in GDP and the trade balance as a proportion of GDP generally
appear to play no signicant role in promoting output growth in Asian countries.
We nd some suggestive evidence that the proportion of exports destined for
industrialized countries may have mattered more for the East and South East
Asian countries, a group that is distinguished by its high growth rate over past
decades. We also nd some preliminary evidence that countries that export
more to developed countries have a higher share of GDP devoted to investment
and a higher share of capital goods in imports.
It is perhaps not surprising that, for developing countries that are well inside
the technological frontier, manufactured exports to industrialized countries can
facilitate growth through knowledge and technology spillovers and the e¤ects
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of international competition. Indeed our main nding is consistent with the
body of recent literature that has found some evidence for exports leading to
productivity growth. Most of this literature, however, is based on rm-level
data. We, on the other hand, nd evidence at the macroeconomic/national
level. Moreover, we nd suggestive evidence that two channels through which
exports to industrialized countries may facilitate growth are those of investment
and the import of capital goods from these countries.
These ndings have some important implications for the post-crisis global
economic architecture. To the extent that our ndings suggest some role for
the size of the tradable sector in promoting growth, the post-crisis world could
still witness rapid growth in Asian countries, albeit one based on the growth of
tradable production for domestic consumption rather than exports. Industrial
policy such as subsidies for tradable production will then have to substitute for
export subsidies. Furthermore, policies that penalize domestic consumption
in order to generate exports will have to be reversed in the face of shrinking
external demand. Shrinking global imbalances need then not be a pressing
concern.
Our nding that the proportion of exports sold to industrialized countries is,
among our variables of interest, the most robustly (and positively) associated
with growth, however, has less sanguine implications. Since pre-crisis global
imbalances largely involved industrial country trade decits, a shrinking of such
imbalances will almost certainly require a decline in these decits. In principle
such decits could decline through greater industrialized country export growth
without a fall in import growth. However, add to this the near certainty
that slow industrialized country income growth will cause demand from these
countries to grow at a slower clip, and we get the important implication that
Asian exports to industrialized countries are likely to decelerate, which in light
of our main nding, is a cause for concern. Put di¤erently, the fact that tradable
production for domestic consumption may not be good substitutes for exports to
industrialized countries magnies the challenges facing sustained Asian growth
in the coming years. Export-led growth v2.0 in this sense may not be a good
substitute for export-led growth v1.0.
Our study has focused on the growth determinants that relate to tradable
and exportable sector issues. A more exhaustive analysis, beyond the scope
of our study, will incorporate other variables that are typically seen as causing
or hampering growth. It might be interesting too to extend the analysis to
investigate whether other developing countries behave di¤erently than the Asian
sample that we analyzed. We hope to pursue these questions in future work.
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Table 4: Baseline growth regressions, 1953-2009
Dependent variable: GRGDPCH (Growth rate of real GDP per capita)a
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS OLS OLS OLS GMM GMM
Baseline Specific I Specific II Specific I Baseline Specific I
Standardized variables
Constant 0.1799 0.2462*** 0.3369***
(1.52) (3.67) (4.16)
GRGDPCH t-1 0.0227 0.1320*
(0.13) (1.76)
Ln RGDPCH t-1 -0.0236 -0.0300*** -0.0444*** -1.0024*** -0.0249 -0.0217*
(-1.64) (-3.67) (-4.02) (-4.02) (-1.08) (-1.78)
INDUSTRY_PROP_GDP 0.0032** 0.0033*** 0.0017*** 1.0023*** 0.0034
(2.28) (2.60) (2.67) (2.67) (1.47)
INDUSTRY_PROP_GDP t-1 -0.0013 -0.0024*** -0.7569*** -0.0064** -0.0013*
(-0.85) (-2.49) (-2.49) (-2.37) (-1.66)




MANUF_X_GDP t-1 0.0011** 0.0032** 0.0021**
(2.37) (2.24) (2.37)




TB_PROP_GDP t-1 -0.0009 0.0003
(-1.35) (-0.19)




PROPORTION_X_DEVELOPED t-1 0.0150 0.1997*
(0.54) (1.75)
PROPORTION_X_DEVELOPED t-2 0.0261** 0.0336** 0.0413*** 0.1746*** -0.0142 0.0753***
(2.31) (2.40) (4.11) (2.40) (-0.23) (2.61)
Time Dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
Country Dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
LnINDt + LnINDt-1 + LnINDt-2 0.0012 0.0150 0.2454 -0.0011
Wald statistic 2.91 1.24 1.24 0.36
p-value [0.090] [0.266] [0.266] [0.549]
LnMANt + LnMANt-1 + LnMANt-2 -0.0001 -0.0003 0.0003
Wald statistic 0.52 0.28 1.54
p-value [0.471] [0.598] [0.216]
LnTBt + LnTBt-1 + LnTBt-2 -0.0006 0.0001
Wald statistic 1.84 0.04
p-value [0.176] [0.848]
LnPROt + LnPROt-1 + LnPROt-2 0.0378 -0.0065
Wald statistic 2.40 0.01
p-value [0.122] [0.927]
Adjusted R-squared 0.56 0.50 0.57 0.57
J-statistic 16.69 32.89
Instrument rank 41 40
Sargan test (p-value) 0.34 0.06
Cross-sections included 29 33 33 33 25 27
Observations 209 252 258 258 149 172
25
Table 5: Growth regressions that include an Asian crisis dummy, 1953-2009
Dependent variable: GRGDPCH (Growth rate of real GDP chain per capita)a
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS OLS GMM GMM
General Specific General Specific
Constant 0.1512* 0.2004***
(1.88) (3.29)
GRGDPCH t-1 -0.0018 0.1138*
(-0.01) (1.90)
Ln RGDPCH t-1 -0.0182* -0.0211*** -0.0296** -0.0185*
(-1.70) (-2.61) (-2.16) (-1.77)
INDUSTRY_PROP_GDP 0.0035*** 0.0023*** 0.0032
(3.07) (3.35) (1.40)
INDUSTRY_PROP_GDP t-1 -0.0010 -0.0046** -0.0022***
(-0.77) (-2.38) (-3.00)




MANUF_X_GDP t-1 0.0010** 0.0017
(2.14) (1.44)




TB_PROP_GDP t-1 -0.001 -0.0007
(-1.63) (-0.82)
TB_PROP_GDP t-2 0.0011*** 0.0006*** 0.0011** 0.0007**
(4.02) (3.80) (2.22) (2.55)
PROPORTION_X_DEVELOPED -0.0153 -0.1118**
(-0.67) (-1.98)
PROPORTION_X_DEVELOPED t-1 0.0086 0.1024
(0.31) (1.24)
PROPORTION_X_DEVELOPED t-2 0.0518*** 0.0647*** 0.0513 0.0877***
(3.5212) (5.27) (0.96) (4.12)
ASIAN_CRISIS (PERIOD 1998-2000 =1) -0.0289*** -0.0293*** -0.0221* -0.0402***
(-5.47) (-11.14) (-1.80) (-5.30)
Country Dummies yes yes yes yes
 LnINDt + LnINDt-1 + LnINDt-2 0.0007 -0.0003 -0.0002
Wald statistic 0.99 0.755 0.019
p-value [0.322] [0.386] [0.890]
LnMANt + LnMANt-1 + LnMANt-2 -0.0000 0.0000
Wald statistic 0.07 0.001
p-value [0.797] [0.973]
LnTBt + LnTBt-1 + LnTBt-2 -0.0002 0.0000
Wald statistic 0.37 0.02
p-value [0.543] [0.883]
LnPROt + LnPROt-1 + LnPROt-2 0.0451 0.0418
Wald statistic 5.66 0.728
p-value [0.018] [0.395]
Adjusted R-squared 0.55 0.53
J-statistic 18.55 19.94
Instrument rank 29 28
Sargan test (p-value) 0.18 0.34
Cross-sections included 29 33 25 27
Observations 209 229 149 163
a(t -statistic), *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01
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Table 6: Growth regressions run after including Japan as a destination exporting
country, 1953-2009
Dependent variable: GRGDPCH (Growth rate of real GDP chain per capita)a
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dummy Asian Crisis Dummy Asian Crisis
General Specific General Specific
Constant 0.1746 0.2462*** 0.1340 0.1719***
(1.38) (3.59) (1.61) (2.96)
Ln RGDPCH t-1 -0.0232 -0.0300*** -0.0162 -0.0174**
(-1.53) (-3.56) (-1.46) (-2.20)
INDUSTRY_PROP_GDP 0.0032** 0.0033*** 0.0035*** 0.0023***
(2.32) (2.67) (3.13) (3.50)
INDUSTRY_PROP_GDP t-1 -0.0012 -0.0025** -0.0010
(-0.80) (-2.55) (-0.75)




MANUF_X_GDP t-1 0.0011** 0.0010**
(2.33) (2.09)




TB_PROP_GDP t-1 -0.0009 -0.001
(-1.38) (-1.61)




PROPORTION_X_DEVELOPED t-1 0.0110 -0.0034
(0.34) (-0.13)
PROPORTION_X_DEVELOPED t-2 0.0220 0.0249* 0.0492*** 0.0530***
(1.63) (1.81) (3.28) (4.58)
ASIAN_CRISIS (PERIOD 1998-2000 =1) -0.0294*** -0.0285***
(-5.78) (-10.21)
Time Dummies yes yes no no
Country Dummies yes yes yes yes
 LnINDt + LnINDt-1 + LnINDt-2 0.0013 0.0009 0.0007 -0.0004
Wald statistic 3.47 2.02 0.92 1.15
p-value [0.07] [0.157] [0.338] [0.285]
LnMANt + LnMANt-1 + LnMANt-2 -0.0002 0.0000
Wald statistic 0.58 0.03
p-value [0.446] [0.852]
LnTBt + LnTBt-1 + LnTBt-2 -0.0007 -0.0003
Wald statistic 2.15 0.51
p-value [0.144] [0.476]
LnPROt + LnPROt-1 + LnPROt-2 0.0307 0.04
Wald statistic 1.35 3.71
p-value [0.247] [0.056]
Adjusted R-squared 0.56 0.50 0.54 0.52
Cross-sections included 29 33 29 33
Observations 209 252 209 229
a(t -statistic), *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01
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Table 7: Growth regressions for cross-sectional and temporal sub-samples
Dependent variable: GRGDPCH (Growth rate of real GDP  per capita)a
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
General Specific General Specific General Specific General Specific
Constant 0.0629 -0.0267 0.5464* 0.7107*** 0.3417 0.1375 0.4634** 0.5973***
(0.29) (-1.07) (1.79) (3.35) (1.64) (0.74) (2.03) (2.83)
Ln RGDPCH t-1 -0.0006 -0.0779* -0.0963*** -0.0565** -0.0211 -0.0495* -0.0609
(-0.33) (-1.96) (-3.48) (-2.11) (-0.82) (-1.83) (-2.57)
INDUSTRY_PROP_GDP 0.0048*** 0.0011** 0.0025** 0.0022*** 0.0072*** 0.0056*** 0.0008
(3.13) (1.95) (2.35) (3.79) (3.963) (5.90) (0.92)
INDUSTRY_PROP_GDP t-1 -0.0043*** 0.0006 -0.0021 -0.0004
(-3.61) (0.44) (-1.10) (-0.33)
INDUSTRY_PROP_GDP t-2 -0.0000 0.0007 -0.0009 -0.0041*** -0.0010 -0.0007**
(-0.05) (0.61) (-0.99) (-3.53) (-0.82) (-1.98)
MANUF_X_GDP 0.0001 -0.0005** 0.0000 -0.0005 -0.0010***-0.0005***
(0.31) (-2.54) (0.07) (-0.76) (-3.47) (-2.62)
MANUF_X_GDP t-1 0.0002 0.0013** 0.0020* 0.0010 0.0007* 0.0009***
(0.39) (2.20) (1.76) (0.86) (1.70) (3.33)
MANUF_X_GDP t-2 -0.0003 -0.0011** -0.0011 -0.0001 -0.0004
(-0.65) (-2.34) (-0.91) (-0.11) (-1.40)
TB_PROP_GDP -0.0022*** 0.0002 -0.0012* -0.0011* 0.0004
(-2.88) (0.32) (-1.72) (-1.82) (1.24)
TB_PROP_GDP t-1 0.0019*** -0.0025*** -0.0014** -0.0012 -0.0011* -0.0009
(2.74) (-2.78) (-2.12) (-1.66) (-2.16) (-1.15)
TB_PROP_GDP t-2 -0.0005 -0.0005 0.0008** 0.0015*** 0.0002
(-0.61) (-1.04) (2.4) (3.46) (0.38)
PROPORTION_X_DEVELOPED -0.0170 0.0155 -0.0157 0.0579
(-0.27) (0.38) (-0.48) (0.95)
PROPORTION_X_DEVELOPED t-1 0.0235 0.0373** -0.0197 -0.0143 0.0283
(0.75) (2.57) (-0.28) (-0.43) (0.77)
PROPORTION_X_DEVELOPED t-2 0.0271 0.0646*** -0.0317 0.0442* 0.0073 0.0334***
(1.24) (3.69) (-0.72) (1.77) (0.43) (2.77)
Time Dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Country Dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
 LnINDt + LnINDt-1 + LnINDt-2 0.0004 0.0039 0.0042 0.0015 -0.0007
Wald statistic 0.59 5.68 9.66 3.64 2.06
p-value [0.44] [0.02] [0.002] [0.057] [0.151]0.0004
LnMANt + LnMANt-1 + LnMANt-2 0.0000 -0.0003 0.0009 0.0004 -0.0005
Wald statistic 0.003 1.30 0.35 0.51 3.04
p-value [0.955] [0.257] [0.556] [0.438] [0.081]
LnTBt + LnTBt-1 + LnTBt-2 -0.0007 -0.0028 -0.0015 -0.00075 -0.0003
Wald statistic 1.99 2.82 4.47 2.65 0.12
p-value [0.162] [0.09] [0.025] [0.1034] [0.726]
LnPROt + LnPROt-1 + LnPROt-2 0.0335 0.1020 -0.0358 0.0141 0.0935
Wald statistic 0.84 32.37 1.08 0.22 3.22
p-value [0.362] [0.000] [0.30] [0.640] [0.073]
Adjusted R-squared 0.70 0.59 0.51 0.33 0.56 0.60 0.67 0.6
Cross-sections included 11 11 18 26 20 23 29 30
Observations 95 116 114 222 119 149 142 160
a(t -statistic), *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01
East and South Rest of Asia 1953-95 1989-2009
East Asia
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Table 8: Growth regressions excluding outliers (1953-2009)
Dependent variable: GRGDPCH (Growth rate of real GDP  per capita)a
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
General Specific General Specific General SpecificGeneral
Constant 0.1403 0.2751*** 0.1688 0.0266*** 0.1799 0.2625***
(1.42) (3.67) (1.44) (4.26) (-1.52) 4.34
Ln RGDPCH t-1 -0.0189 -0.0389*** -0.0222 -0.0331*** -0.0236 -0.0315***
(-1.36) (-3.39) (-1.52) (-3.76) (-1.64) (-4.36)
INDUSTRY_PROP_GDP 0.0035** 0.0049** 0.0032** 0.0026** 0.0032** 0.0024**
(2.18) (2.73) (2.24) (2.28) 2.28 (2.44)
INDUSTRY_PROP_GDP t-1 -0.0015 -0.0031** -0.0014 -0.0017** -0.0007 -0.0017***
(-0.79) (-2.31) (-0.97) (-2.49) (-0.85) (-2.70)
INDUSTRY_PROP_GDP t-2 -0.0015 -0.0007 -0.001
(-0.79) (-0.60) (-0.62)
MANUF_X_GDP -0.0006 -0.0001** -0.0006
(-1.25) (-2.00) (-1.54)
MANUF_X_GDP t-1 0.0018* 0.0012** 0.0014** 0.0011**
(1.96) (2.24) (2.01) (2.37)
MANUF_X_GDP t-2 -0.0015*** -0.0014*** -0.0006 -0.0007**
(-2.67) (-3.12) (-1.22) (-2.200)
TB_PROP_GDP -0.0011 -0.0002 -0.0003
(-1.30) (-0.46) (-0.54)
TB_PROP_GDP t-1 0.0002 -0.0009 -0.0009
(0.39) (-1.422) (-1.35)
TB_PROP_GDP t-2 0.0005 0.0006 0.0005
(0.89) (1.63) (1.51)
PROPORTION_X_DEVELOPED 0.0075 -0.0014 -0.0034
(0.35) (-0.06) (-0.16)
PROPORTION_X_DEVELOPED t-1 -0.0002 0.0169 0.0151
(-0.01) (0.59) (0.54)
PROPORTION_X_DEVELOPED t-2 0.0403*** 0.0387** 0.0234** 0.3373** 0.0261** 0.0372***
(2.891) (2.32) (1.97) (2.53) (2.31) (2.85)
Time Dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
Country Dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
 LnINDt + LnINDt-1 + LnINDt-2 0.0009 0.0018 0.0011 0.0009 0.0012 0.0008
Wald statistic 0.58 3.41 1.34 1.24 2.91 1.56
p-value [0.446] [0.0648] [0.247] [0.266] [0.088] [0.212]
LnMANt + LnMANt-1 + LnMANt-2 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0002
Wald statistic 0.92 0.84 0.16 0.05
p-value [0.338] [0.358] [0.686] [0.471]
LnTBt + LnTBt-1 + LnTBt-2 -0.0004 -0.0006 -0.0006
Wald statistic 0.14 1.32 1.84
p-value [0.712] [0.250] [0.175]
LnPROt + LnPROt-1 + LnPROt-2 0.0476 0.0389 0.0378
Wald statistic 4.01 2.533 2.4
p-value [0.045] [0.112] [0.121]
Adjusted R-squared 0.56 0.55 0.56 0.49 0.56 0.51
Cross-sections included 24 27 27 29 29 31
Observations 180 197 196 217 209 241
a(t -statistic), *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01
RGDPCH <=20,000 MANUF_X_GDP<=60% Proportion_X_Developed<=60%
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Table 9: Robustness to additional variable(s) "Z" (GMM panel regressions)
Dependent variable: GRGDPCH (Growth rate of real GDP per capita)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
OPENC(-2) SAV_GDP(-2) GG(-2) TOT(-2)
Baseline
GRGDPCH t-1 0.1654*** 0.1749*** 0.0700 0.0538 0.0438
(2.81) (2.94) (1.22) (0.97) (0.59)
Ln RGDPCH t-1 -0.0340*** -0.0302*** -0.0503*** -0.0416*** -0.0491***
(-4.92) (-3.86) (-5.88) (-6.08) (-3.24)
PROPORTION_X_DEVELOPED t-2 0.0452* 0.0471* 0.0706*** 0.0611*** 0.0408
(1.80) (1.88) (3.25) (2.78) (1.41)
Z -0.0001 0.0003 -0.0017*** 0.0000
(-0.86) (1.04) (-3.57) (0.33)
Time Dummies yes yes yes yes yes
Country Dummies yes yes yes yes yes
J-statistic 103.23 102.35 108.03 100.98 51.36
Instrument rank 102 102 102 102 57
Sargan test (p-value) 0.10 0.10 0.05 0.11 0.27
Cross-sections included 37 37 35 34 30
Observations 276 276 246 247 118
(t -statistic), *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01
Figure 1: Weighted current account as a proportion of GDP for the 19 indus-
trialized countries in our sample (1999-2010)
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Table 10: Possible Transmission Channels, OLS, 1953-2009
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable:a
Specific Standardized Specific Standardized
Constant 4.1913 -0.1953** 0.2521*** -0.1112











TB_PROP_GDP t-1 0.0009*** 3.7416***
(2.62) -2.62
TB_PROP_GDP t-2 0.0543* 3.2772*
(1.92) (1.92)
PROPORTION_X_DEVELOPED
PROPORTION_X_DEVELOPED t-1 5.9136** 0.1582**
(2.28) (2.28)
PROPORTION_X_DEVELOPED t-2 0.0924** 0.1706**
(2.33) (2.33)
Time Dummies yes yes yes yes
Country Dummies yes yes yes yes
 LnINDt + LnINDt-1 + LnINDt-2
Wald statistic
p-value
LnMANt + LnMANt-1 + LnMANt-2
Wald statistic
p-value
LnTBt + LnTBt-1 + LnTBt-2 -0.3749 2.3254
Wald statistic 47.23 1.90
p-value [0.000] [0.1676]
LnPROt + LnPROt-1 + LnPROt-2
Wald statistic
p-value
Adjusted R-squared 0.79 0.79 0.72 0.72
Cross-sections included 33 33 33 33
Observations 256 256 280 280
a(t -statistic), *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01
GFCF_PROP_GDP K_PROP_TOTAL_IMPORTS
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Figure 2: Mean of real per capita GDP and other variables for Asian countries
(1950-2007)
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Figure 3: Distributions of main variables of interest
33
Figure 4: Scatterplot of GRGDPCH versus Pr oportion_X_Developed for the
entire sample.
Figure 5: Scatterplot of GRGDPCH versus Pr oportion_X_Developed for
RGDPCH 6 20; 000.
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